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RESTRAINTS ON INCUMBENT DIRECTORS IN
INTRACORPORATE BATTLES FOR CONTROL
Dr. Aaron Yoran*
[Editor's Note: This issue contains the Introduction and first portion
of Dr. Yoran's Article. The remainder will appear in the Spring issue.]
INTRODUCTION
A NY organization that entrusts the management of its affairs to a
controlling group must devise checks to restrain the controllers
during their incumbency. Those in control must specifically be placed
under restraints that will prevent their using the organization's powers
and assets to perpetuate their incumbency. In the corporate system, the
need for effective restraints has become more compelling with the pro-
gression from private ownership through majority ownership and minor-
ity control to management control.'
In light of this development, the courts have invented the derivative
suit to enable shareholders to redress corporate claims against directors
when the directors' control over the power to sue prevents the corpora-
tion from suing its directors. A derivative suit to redress abuse of direc-
torial powers for perpetuation of control may be brought only if such
abuse is redressable by the corporation itself. Derivative suits, morever,
are subject to burdensome restrictions.2 This article examines, therefore,
whether abuse of directorial powers is a breach of the directors' duties
and whether derivative suits are available to redress abuses of directors
power for retention of control.
At one time it was thought that, with ownership separated from con-
trol, the shareholders' dearest right was suffrage-the right to determine
*Lecturer in Law, Hebrew University; LL.B., Hebrew University, 1966; LL.M.,
Columbia University, 1968; S.JD, Harvard University, 1971.
1 See A. BarE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 94
(1934). Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An Interest Analysis, 21
CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 613, 678-79 (1970), points out that takeover bids may be a solu-
tion to the problem of the separation of ownership and control. Through a bid, an
offeror may assemble from scattered holdings a minority control block or even a ma-
jority block. Note, however, that the offeror itself is most often a publicly held com-
pany suffering from a divorce of ownership and control. The concentration of manage-
ment control in fewer, larger companies amplifies rather than cures the problem of
directors having virtually uncontrolled power to manage other people's money.
2 This is true especially in England where a derivative suit for negligent mismanage-
ment has not been allowed thus far. Boyle, The Sbareholders' Derivative Action in
Anglo-American Law, 35 (SJ.D. paper, Harvard Law School, 1969).
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by vote who should manage the corporate business for the common
benefit (the power to hire and fire). It is now accepted, however, that
"shareholders democracy" has become a myths because of the advantages
that directors derive from their control of the corporate machinery and
powers during intracorporate battles for control.
Recently, it has been suggested that the market for corporate control,
rather than corporate democracy, safeguards the value of shares in pub-
licly held corporations. Briefly, this market operates in the following
manner. Shareholders respond to poor management by selling, and the
market price is driven down to the point indicated by the quality of the
incumbents' management. Outsiders who think that their own, more
efficient, management could generate higher prices will purchase control.
These outsiders will respond to the opportunity to make capital gains
by purchasing control, managing the corporation efficiently, and either
enhancing or realizing the value of their investment. This process, by
which individuals think only in terms of personal gain, both enhances
the value of shares in the corporation and provides a stronger incentive
to managerial efficiency than the derivative suit or the power to hire
and fire.4 A proper functioning of the market for corporate control,
however, requires that outsiders have techniques at their disposal for
purchasing control in spite of incumbents' opposition. The two tech-
niques available to the insurgents are the proxy contest and the takeover
bid. The proxy contest, however, being an intracorporate control battle,
is subject to the same limitations that render shareholder democracy a
fiction.5
This article analyzes the duties of incumbent directors in intracor-
porate battles for corporate control in two jurisdictions: the United
States and England. First, one should compare the restraints that are
imposed in these jurisdictions to prevent the directors of closely held
3E. MASON, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN Socim 5-6 (Atheneum ed. 1966); Gower,
Book Review, 68 HARV. L. Rxv. 922 (1954); Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477,
1487-88 (1958).
4 Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 1427 (1964);
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
The existence of a separate market for corporate control was denied by Berle, Modern
Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1962). Brudney, A Note
on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 631, n. 48 (1967), thinks that
"the 'market' is extremely thin and seems to operate only interstitially."
5 A comparative study on restraints on defensive tactics against takeover bids is the
subject of another article by the author. Most of the defensive tactics employed against
takeover bids may also be employed against proxy fights.
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companies from using corporate powers to perpetuate their control.
Then, in order to ascertain what remains of the concept of shareholders
democracy in closely and publicly held corporations, one should com-
pare the rules that these systems have set up for insurgents' access to
shareholders and for shareholders to exercise their power to appoint
and remove directors.
DIRECTORS' MANEUVERING POWER IN CLOSED CORPORATIONS
Presentation of the Problem
In closed corporations, the management is usually appointed accord-
ing to the distribution of voting power or some understanding between
the coventurers.6 Proxy machinery plays either no role or only a mar-
ginal one. Those instances when incumbent directors use corporate
powers for maintaining control occur either when through acquisitions
a shift in voting power dispossesses the incumbents of voting control, or
when the shareholders who once instated the directors want them re-
moved. To perpetuate control, the directors may then use various
measures, for example, the issuance of additional shares to themselves, or
the vitiation of acquisitions that have taken place by refusing to register
them.
In determining whether the incumbent directors have misused their
powers, the first issue examined in a legal forum is the purpose for
which the power was utilized. If a challenger contends that the
incumbents exercised their power to maintain or gain control, the in-
cumbents may reply that they used the power to achieve a proper cor-
porate purpose. Disposition of this issue hinges on which party carries
the burden of proof or whether a court will infer from the mere fact
that control was shifted that power was exercised to achieve that result.
Despite the presence of the control motive, the directors may, however,
manage to show that their acts also achieved a proper corporate purpose,
thus raising the question of the validity of the exercise of a corporate
power for multiple purposes, one proper, the other improper. Theo-
retically, one of several principles may be applied to such a situation. To
outlaw manipulations of control, a legal system may invalidate the act.
It may, alternatively, espouse a test of primacy of purpose: if the primary
purpose was a proper one, the act will stand. This test is difficult to
See F. O'NEAL, CLosE Copo~x~oNs: LAw AND PRAcMCE, Chs. III, IV, V (Supp.
1968); O'Neal, Control Distribution Devices, U. ILL. L.J. 48 (1969)...
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apply, and in reality may injure the corporation by invalidating profit-
able transactions. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle
that the presence of any proper corporate purpose is sufficient to uphold
the act even if the exercise of power was primarily actuated by a control
motive. This rule fails to restrain those directors who will attempt to
clothe every control tactic in the proper dress. Even if it is established
that the power was exercised to effect control, the directors still may
argue that, under the circumstances, the very effecting of control was a
proper corporate purpose. They will maintain that the shareholder
whose voting power they diluted would have otherwise ruined the
company.
In litigating the issue of whether the foiling of a policy considered
injurious to the company is in and of itself a corporate purpose, the
burden of proof becomes crucial. The challenger will find it extremely
difficult to prove that the directors effected control in order to perpetuate
their incumbency rather than their policy. A rule recognizing the de-
fense of defeating a ruinous policy without shifting the burden of proof
to the directors is almost tantamount to holding that maintaining control
is always a valid corporate purpose.
If, after raising all of the above issues, 7 the directors fail, the question
of an adequate remedy may handicap judicial intervention. If the direc-
tors issued shares to themselves, or to friendly parties aware of the pur-
pose of the issuance, the court might easily cancel the issuance. How-
ever, if the third parties are not cognizant of the motive actuating the
issuance, its vitiation will be difficult. The final hurdle in the path of
the challenger is his standing to bring a derivative or direct suit in light
of the English Foss v. Harbottle rule of no interference, or its American
counterpart.
This question and those issues previously raised will be examined in
the light of the legal system of England and the United States. Even
if the general approach of the two systems is identical, still a variation
in the disposition of one of the above-mentioned issues may make all the
difference.
7 Inadequacy of consideration or self-dealing may be additional grounds for attacking
a transaction resorted to by the directors in order to secure control.
8 2 Hare 461 (1843).
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English Law
In England, the initial case of Fraser v. Whalley,9 involving a statutory
railway company, established the precedent. Although the shares of the
company were publicly held, one shareholder (a contractor of the rail-
way being paid in shares) held 75% of the voting power, a setup similar
to the structure of a closely held company. On the verge of a general
meeting, the directors of the railway company learned that they were
likely to be removed by the controlling shareholder. In order to foil
their removal and to control the ensuing general meeting, they resolved
to place shares into friendly hands. The court enjoined the issuance of
the shares and rejected the directors' contention that they had a business
purpose in issuing the stock. The court failed to elaborate on whom
the burden of proving the actuating purpose lies. It emphasized that it
was irrelevant whether the policy advocated by the directors or that ad-
vocated by the insurgent (holder of 75% of the voting power) was more
in the interest of the company, stating "that is a matter wholly for the
shareholders." 10 The case thereby established that directors may not use
corporate powers to perpetuate control, even if they sincerely believe
that foiling the insurgent is in the interests of the company. The force
of the Fraser decision is weakened, however, by the fact that the direc-
tors purported to act on the authority of a slate shareholders' resolution
entrusting the issuing power to them for a different purpose. Thus it
may be argued that-the decision is based on ultra vires rather than on
misuse of existing powers.
A later case, Punt v.. Symons & Company, Ltd.," upheld the Fraser
ruling as regards a private joint stock company. The circumstances in
that case were somewhat odd. A controlling shareholder, empowered
by the bylaws, appointed two general directors. When the latter 'realized
that they were going to be removed, they hastened to issue shares to their
friends for the purpose of amending the bylaws so as to cancel the ap-
pointing and removing power of the controlling shareholder and thereby
perpetuate their own control. Since the controlling shareholder could
not, according to the bylaws, demand a poll, a distinct minority, in-
eluding the new shareholders, would thus have been able to alter the
bylaws and permanently entrench the incumbent directors. The court
9 2 H. & M. 10, 71 Eng. Rep. 361 (1864).
10 71 Eng. Rep 361, 369 (1864).
11 [1903J 2 Ch. 506.
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held that the directors misused their corporate power and enjoined the
convening of a special meeting to alter the bylaws. The court found
that the shares were issued "for the express purpose of acquiring an un-
fair majority for the purpose of altering the rights of parties under the
articles" 12 and that they "were not issued bona fide for the general ad-
vantage of the company." 13 The court stressed that the issuing power
could be used in the ordinary case only for the purpose of raising capital.
The court allowed that, on certain occasions, other purposes for the use
of the power would be proper. However, the example it gave14 (issuance
to create a sufficient number of shareholders to exercise a statutory
power), and the endorsement of the Fraser ruling, establish that the
foiling of a corporate policy considered injurious will not qualify as a
proper business purpose.
In the next case, Piercy v. Mills & Company, Ltd.,' 5 the court found
that "shares were allotted simply and solely for the purpose of retaining
control in the hands of the existing directors." 16 When the insurgent
continued to acquire shares and again mustered a majority, the directors
repeated their move and diluted his voting power to a minority. Since
the court found that all the directors realized that the sole purpose of
the allotment was to keep control and maintain a majority over the
plaintiff, and that the company was not in need of further capital, it had
no difficulty in vitiating the allotment. The court emphasized that it had
no concern whatsoever with the merits of the dispute between the direc-
tors and the insurgent.
In none of these cases was the issue of burden of proof discussed be-
cause the courts in each case established as a fact the control motivation
of the issuance. Neither was the question of multiple-purpose issuance
decided. The directors in Piercy argued that "if one of the many motives
for the allotment was to control the voting power, that is not enough to
invalidate the whole allotment," 1 but the court found such motive to
be the sole one and did not reach the issue. English and Commonwealth
law on other aspects of multi-purpose use of power, however, tend to
validate an act if the primary purpose is proper.'8
12 Id. at 517. The English use the term articles for what the Americans call bylaws.
13 Id. at 515.
'4 Id. at 516.
15 [1920] 1 Ch. 77.
1id. at 79.
17 Id at 82.
1s Hirsche v. Sims, [1894) A.C. 654; Hindle v. John Cotton Ltd, 56 Scots L.TR.
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I Although only Fraser dealt squarely with the problem, English courts
reject the contention that foiling an injurious business policy is a cor-
porate purpose for issuing shares.19 The cases establish that raising capital
is usually the only recognized corporate purpose for issuing shares.
Nevertheless, the courts have accepted other proper purposes, even for
closely held corporations, 20 but they have not defined the outer limits.
21
In the above-discussed cases, the courts did not face a difficulty in
fashioning an appropriate remedy.22 In Fraser, the insurgent was quick
625 (1919 Scot.); Mills v. Mills, (1938) 60 C.L.R. 150 (Austr. H.C.). See L. GOWER,
MODERN ComirPAY LAW 524, n. 55 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as GowER].
19 Sealy, Note on Hogg v. Cramphorn, CAmB. LJ. 33, 34 (1967), criticizes the Hogg
Court ([1967] Ch. 254) for citing the Punt and Piercy decisions as authorities for the
proposition that defeating a policy genuinely believed to be injurious is not a proper
corporate purpose. The criticism is not warranted. Sealy overlooks the statement in
Fraser and its endorsement in Punt and in Piercy.
20 Acquisitions and option plans are generally accepted as proper purposes for allot-
ments of publicly held corporations. Issuing a determinative share to a neutral person
to prevent a deadlock will presumably be upheld as proper for a closely held company.
21 Commonwealth jurisdictions follow the English example. There was much litiga-
tion on the subject in Canada, summarized in J. FRASER & M. STEwART, COMPANY LAW
OF CANADA 205 (4th ed. 1962). Boinsteel v. Collis Leather Co., 45 Ont. L.R. 195
(1919), stands for the proposition that defeating a business policy of controlling share-
holders is not a proper corporate purpose, even when the directors in good faith believe
the rejection of such policy is in the best interest of the corporation. But see the
dictum in the minority decision of Harvey, C.J.A, in Spooner v. Spooner Oils Ltd,
[1936] 2 D.L.R. 634, 636, advocating in the context of a closely held corporation the
rule Delaware has prescribed lately for public corporations: "There is nothing in the
authorities cited that would stand in the way of upholding an issue of shares for the
sole purpose of giving someone control of the company if the directors honestly be-
lieved on reasonable grounds that it was for the interest of the company that that
should be done." It ought to be borne in mind, however, that these words were directed
at a situation of continuing internal dissension and disharmony incident to the fight for
control of the company. American courts also relax the condemnatory rule in freeze-
out situations. See O'NEAL & DERwIN, ExPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BusINEss AssOcIATEs
91-98 (1961); Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 271, 278 (1957).
22The recent case of Pergamon Press Ltd. v. Maxwell, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1167, dealt
with a somewhat different aspect of the question of appropriate remedy. An English
corporation taken over by an American corporation contended that Maxwell, its general
director and chairman, had utilized a corporate power to perpetuate his presidency of
a New York subsidiary of the English corporation. Maxwell voted the parent's 70%
stock in the subsidiary to repeal a by-law entitling a majority stockholder to have a
special general meeting convened. The cancellation of the by-law entrenched Maxwell
in control of the subsidiary until the next general meeting, despite the fact that when
the parent was taken over, Maxwell was removed from office by the parent. The parent
failed to secure removal in New York courts. As a last resort, the parent brought an
action in England asking the court to order Maxwell to exercise his power as the sub-
sidiary's president and convene a general meeting of the subsidiary. Only such order,
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enough to enjoin the issuance. In Punt, the only remedy sought was an
injunction to convene a confirmatory general meeting. In Piercy, the
directors issued shares, inter alia, to a third person. The court did not,
however, have to deal with that issuance, because the third person was
not made a party to .the proceeding.23
The issue of standing to sue was directly addressed in Fraser. The
Fraser court recorded its endorsement of the rule of Foss v. Harbottle,
but distinguished Foss by stating that "if the directors can clandestinely
and at the last moment use a stale resolution for the express purpose of
preventing the free action of the shareholders, this Court will take care
that, when the company can not interfere, the Court will do so." 24
Fraser may therefore be read as establishing either a direct action by the
controlling shareholder to defend his franchise, or a derivative corporate
action. Later expressions in the decision about a wrong, and mischief to
the corporation, tend to show that the court had in mind a derivative
suit. 25 A plausible explanation is that a derivative action was sustained
on the ground that a misuse of power by incumbents who emerged in
control is an unratifiable wrong to the company. 26 As the editor of the
decision very properly pointed out, Fraser involved not "a question of
the internal management of the company, but an attempt on the part of
the directors to prevent such management from being legitimately car-
ried on." 27
In all the above cases, the directors acted when the insurgents had a
legal majority. In Fraser and in Punt, the insurgents had previously
installed the directors and then became upset with their management.
In Piercy, the insurgents acquired control between the installation of
argued the parent, would restore the situation as it prevailed before Maxwell misused
his power to vote the parent's stock in the subsidiary. The court refused to grant the
requested remedy on two grounds: (a) that it was not an appropriate tribunal to
decide about the exercise of powers of an American corporation; and (b) that the
New York corporation was an indispensable party to the proceedings. A New York
court would not order the president of a New York corporation to convene a general
meeting because, in his capacity as general director of an English parent, he misused a
corporate power. In short, the English parent could not obtain an effective remedy for
the misuse of power, either in England or in the United States.
23 [1920] 1 Ch. 77, 79.
24 71 Eng. Rep. 361, 369 (1864).
25 Id. at 370.
26 Note that even if the wrong were ratifiable there would be no point in remitting
the matter to a general meeting where the new shares could not be voted. Plaintiffs
would no doubt prevail in that instance.
27 Id. at 361.
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the-management and the forthcoming general meeting. One could ques-
don whether the same restrictions2 .would be placed on directors when
the insurgent has not yet mustered legal control. In a recent case, In
re jermyn Street Turkish Bath, Ltd.29 the lower court held that the is-
suance of additional shares by a 50% incumbent shareholder was clearly
a misuse of power. The court had no difficulty in discrediting the
evidence of the incumbent director and in finding that her actuating
motive was to secure control. Furthermore, the court found that, the
shares were not issued to raise needed capital, even though the corpora-
tion was in dire need of cash, and the director had advanced a loan to
the corporation at the same time she issued the stock to herself. The
court refused to accept the contention that the issuance of stock, which
raised little capital, and the loan, which rescued the corporation, were an
integral transaction. Nevertheless, the court found that the issuance of
stock, which took place 14 years before the proceeding was instituted,
was one in a chain of events which amounted to an oppressive course of
conduct by the incumbent director to qualify the insurgent 50% share-
holder for a Section 210 relief.30 The Court of Appeal, overruling all
2 8 0ne should remember that, unlike American jurisdictions, English courts have
never recognized an obligatory rule of preemptive rights. See Gower, Some Contrasts
Between British and American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1380 (1956).
Hence in England, the only restriction against misuse of the issuing power stems from
fiduciary principles.
29 [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1194.
30 Companies Act, 1948, § 210:
Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are
being conducted in a manner oppressive to some part of the members (in-
cluding himself) . .. may make an' application to the court by petition for an
order under this section. (2) If on any such petition the court is of opinion (a)
that the company's affairs are being conducted as aforesaid; and (b) that to wind
up the company would unfairly prejudice that part of the members, but other-
wise the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground
that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up; the coiirt
may, with a view to bringing an end to the matters complained of, make such an
order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the conduct of the company's affairs
in the future, or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company
by other members of the company or by the company and, in the case of a pur-
chase by the company, for the reduction accordingly of the company's capital, or
otherwise.
Only in rare circumstances will the misuse of power not be a single act but a course
of oppressive conduct to entitle every shareholder to bring a Sec. 210 action. Thus in
In re Jermyn Street Baths a Sec. 210 action finally failed. The oppressive conduct, plain-
tiffs argued, consisted of issuance of shares to secure control, payment of excessivi
salaries without an authorizing shareholders' resolution, cancellatiori of a corporate debt
to the insurgent shareholder, and not sending to that shareholder notices of general
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these holdings, ruled that the allotment was a legitimate act, done in
good faith in the interests of the company, and not oppressive in any
sense.
3 1
While the cases dealing with the power to issue reveal a tendency to
curtail directors' powers,32 In re Smith & Fawcett, Ltd.,3 3 dealing with
the power to refuse registration of transfer of stock, points in the op-
posite direction. In that case the bylaws provided that "the directors
may at any time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion refuse to
register any transfer of shares." When one of the 50% shareholders and
directors died, the remaining shareholder and director refused to regis-
ter the transfer of the totality of the 50% shares to the plaintiff. The re-
maining director agreed to register only the block plaintiff held as legatee
(somewhat more than 25%), and to buy the rest (which plaintiff held as
legal representative of the deceased) at a price fixed by himself. The
court held that the director was warranted in his refusal to register the
transfer, reasoning that the articles conferred upon the directors an un-
qualified discretionary power subject only to the fiduciary principle that
the power he applied in the corporate interest as the directors see it.
The court went on to say that "such matters as ... whether by their
passing a particular transfer the transferee would obtain too great a
weight in the councils of the company or might even perhaps obtain
control" are matters "bearing on the general interests of the company
as a whole" 14 and not ulterior purposes. Consequently, affecting con-
trol is a proper corporate purpose for the exercise of the transfer power
meetings. The lower court accepted this argument ([1970] 1 W.L.R. 1194). However,
the Court of Appeal rejected it ([1971] 1 W.L.R. 1042), mainly because the incumbent
shareholder did not use the additional voting power in effectuating the other acts.
Sec. 210 enables the court to fashion a remedy for regulating the company's affairs
in the future, or to purchase shares from one shareholder by another shareholder or
by the company. This leaves the courts sufficient flexibility to correct a distortion of
the voting power that the directors cause. Moreover, the courts can award something
akin to damages in fixing the price for an ordered transfer of shares. Scottish Co-
operative Wholesale Soc'y Ltd. v. Meyer, (1959) A.C. 324, 369 H.L. (Sc.); In re
Jermyn Street Baths, [1970] I W.L.R. 1194, at 1208.
31 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1042, C.A.
32 As GOWER, supra note 18, 524, n.54 points out, a similar curtailing rule was applied
to other powers, e.g., forfeiture of shares (Stanhope's Case, (1866) L.R. 1 Ch. App.
161), calls (Galloway v. Halle Concerts Society, [1915] 2 Ch. 233), and passing trans-
fers (Bennett's Case, (1854) 5 De G.M. & G. 284). But see In re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.,
[1942] Ch. 304, C.A., discussed infra. See also Boyle, supra note 2, at 40-45.
33 [19421 Ch. 304, C.A.
34 Id. at 308.
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(provided that the articles confer an unqualified power) but it is not an
improper purpose for the utilization of the issuance power. This dis-
crepancy seems inexplicable and unwarranted. The court also rejected
plaintiff's argument that the incumbent director refused to register the
transfer for another collateral purpose, namely a desire to acquire part of
the shares for himself at an under-value. The court held that the burden
of proving the impropriety of purpose rested with the plaintiff, and that
he had failed to discharge it. It would appear from a close examination
of the case that a shifting of the burden of proof was warranted.
The American Approach
The question of the validity of the issuance of shares in closely held
corporations in order to preserve, acquire, or shift control has been ex-
tensively litigated in the United States. 5 The power of American cor-
porations to repurchase their own stock, unlike English corporations,"6
opens another control-affecting tactic for incumbents, and its misuse has
also been heavily litigated . 7 To the extent that a jurisdiction recognizes
preemptive rights, the directors may not in any way abuse the power to
issue for political purposes. However, the fact that the issuance does
not violate the rules of preemption8 does not legalize it. The issuance
35 See authorities collected in Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting
Corporate Control, 65 MicH. L. REv. 259, 265, n. 17 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Brudney]. Brudney's penetrating article contains an excellent analysis of the American
law on this topic.
36English law prohibits a corporation from repurchasing its own stock, regarding it
as a reduction of capital. Trevor v. Whitworth, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409, H.L. American
jurisdictions allow repurchase but impose restrictions to prevent dilution of creditors'
cushion. Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with Corporate Funds, 70 YALE
L.J. 308, 320-21 (1960). The soundness of the American rule has been subject to much
criticism. Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares: The
Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697-98, 706 (1941). The leading English authority,
on the other hand, does not minimize the advantages of the American rule. "While
clearly capable of abuse unless regulated, it has enabled the U.S.A. to adopt a very
much more straightforward alternative to the unit trust-namely the open-end investment
trust company or mutual fund. It also facilitates employee share-ownership schemes
and enables shareholders in private companies to be bought out more easily." Gower,
Memorandum on Corporate Law and Practice in the U.S.A., Appendix XXXIX to
JENMNs REPORT MiNrTrlXs at 1052. This observation was amplified by the American
witnesses, yet the Jenkins Committee was not moved. JENKs s REPORT, CMND. 1749,
Paras. 167, 168 (1962) [hereinafter cited as JENKIwS REPORT].
37 See authorities in Brudney, supra note 35, at 268, n.26.
38 The reason for this is that either the jurisdiction or corporate constitution does
not provide such rights or because they were waived.
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will be subject to further scrutiny to verify its purpose. If the purpose
was to manipulate control, the court will invalidate the issue even
though the diretcors believed the manipulation of control to be in the
best interests of the company.3 9 American decisions in this respect are
more categorical than the English decisions. The few decisions uphold-
ing control-motivated issuances are obsolete40 or were reached to achieve
the very results that the proscription rule aims to effectuate in the usual
circumstances.4' The proscription rule is directed at allotments princi-
pally designed to effect control. The courts do not have difficulty, how-
ever, in administering that rule .4  Due to the structure of a closely held
corporation, the directors can not easily invent an independent corporate
purpose as they successfully do in cases involving publicly held corpora-
tions. Moreover, the courts are ready to infer the electoral purpose of
the issuance from the actual resulting shift in control.43 Therefore, the
fact that the courts place the burden of proof on the challenger4 does
not leave much leeway to the incumbents.
Professor Brudney emphasizes the courts' readiness to invalidate allot-
ments of close corporations in contrast to the upholding of control-moti-
vated allotments of public corporations. He attributes the difference in
attitude to the fact that in a public corporation the control maneuvers
only prevent an insurgent from gaining control, while in private corpora-
tions, they "freeze out" a faction theretofore participating in control and
enjoying the control emoluments. Brudney continues, suggesting that a
rule of preemptive rights, while infeasible for public corporations, may
very well apply to private corporations and thus proscribe selective is-
suances regardless of purpose or motive.45
39 See, e.g., Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Luther v. C.J. Luther
Co., 118 Wis. 112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903). For further cases, see Brudney, supra note 35,
at 267, n.23. Only need of the proceeds of the issuance for the execution of the business
of the corporation is usually recognized as an appropriate business purpose. Elliot v.
Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907).
40 State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266 (1876).
41 In Standard int'l Corp. v. McDonald Printing Co., 159 N.E.2d 822 (Ohio C.P.
1959), the court allowed the minority to issue shares to itself in order to require a
purchaser to pay the minority the same premium he paid to the controlling shareholder.
42 See the cases cited in note 39 supra. See also Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair
Co. 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930); Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15,
47 P.2d 1054 (1935).
43Sheppard v. Wilcox, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412, 419-20 (D. Ct. App. 1962).
44 Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917 (1930);
cf. Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953).
45 Brudney, supra note 35, at 266.
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The cases involving reacquisitions espouse condemnatory rules similar
to those regarding issuances,'46 although a recent Washington case, in-
fluenced by the Delaware cases dealing with public corporations, upheld
a control-motivated reacquisidon.47
Restrictions on Incumbents' Shares Transactions
The question whether incumbents of close corporations may use their
own resources to preserve or gain control has been rarely48 litigated;
however, such practice has been held legitimate in the cases that have
decided the issue.49 Moreover, when invalidating the directors' misuse
of the corporate machinery to improve their voting powers, the courts
note that the directors should have used their own resources. 0
In dealing with other shareholders, the directors are subject to fiduciary
and statutory rules, certainly in the United States and arguably in the
United Kingdom. These rules impose on the directors the duty to dis-
close to their trading parties information that may affect the latters'
decisions whether to sell and, if so, at what price. The fact that the
purpose of the directors' purchase is to preserve or gain control, and
the possibility that a control battle is imminent may affect shareholders'
46See, e.g., Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 478, 123 N.W. 102, 103 (1909)
(dissenting opinion); Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 136-37, 7 S.W.2d 43, 45 (1928);
Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Andersen Mfg. Co, 325 Mass. 343, 346, 90 N.E.2d 541, 544
(1950). The Andersen decision elaborated that a derivative suit can be brought to chal-
lenge the reacquisition since it seeks to vindicate a corporate right against controlling
persons. If Massachusetts, known for its strictness in allowing derivative suits, so holds, a
fortiori are derivative suits allowed in jurisdictions more "liberal" in this respect?
47 Hendricks v. Mill Eng'r & Supp. Co., 68 Wash. 2d 490, 413 P.2d 811 (1966), in
volved not a repurchase but a redemption of callable preferred stock. The charter
allowed redemption "out of earnings or funds not necessary to the conduct of the
business . . . in such manner as may be determined by the board of trustees" Hence
the case might be construed narrowly as relating only to the utilization of a special
broad power conferred in the corporate constitution. Cf. the English case of In re
Smith & Fawcett, Ltd., supra note 30. The disposition of the case does not lend itself
to such a reading, however. The court ruled that the incumbents, convinced that
management by the insurgents would clearly threaten the future of the business and
would bring about the loss of the valuable services of the president to a competitive
outfit, were warranted in "exercising their honest, informed business judgment" to rake
steps to meet the situation. Id. at 814.
48 For American cases, see Brudney, supra note 35, at 289, n.98. There are no English
decisions squarely in point.
49 See, e.g., Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940).
50 The Israeli case of Schadjinsky v. Syndicate of Trucks, Ltd., 19 P.M. 16 (D. Cr.
TA. 1959), approved 13 PD. 1592 (1959), is an example of such a case.
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decisions whether to sell and are, therefore, material facts that must be
disclosed. The significance of the disclosure rules in curtailing the free-
dom of incumbents of closely held companies to engage in transactions
affecting control is, however, marginal at best. The shareholders in the
usual case will be aware of the control arrangements and of the effect
of the transaction on the allocation of voting power. Hence, curtail-
ment can be achieved not through disclosure rules but only through a
condemnatory rule.
Professor Brudney has submitted that the courts should indeed pre-
scribe a condemnatory rule,5' reasoning that fiduciary principles are in-
fringed upon when incumbents deprive participants in the control group
of their share in the control emoluments. The seller, he continues, stands
on the same footing as a seller of a controlling block of shares in a pub-
licly held corporation. Inasmuch as the latter presents a danger to exist-
ing shareholders by placing control in the hands of an irresponsible
purchaser, 52 the former exposes them to similar hazards by depriving
them of their political power. Hence, Brudney concludes, purchaser
and seller should be subject to a prohibitory fiduciary rule. Brudney's
analogy is not warranted. The seller who can tip the scale of voting
power may not be a controlling shareholder, and may not even have
participated in the controlling group. These decisions that deal with
sellers of control of publicly held companies have not subjected holders
of a determinative small block to the accountability rule. Moreover,
when the seller is held liable, he is only obliged to disgorge a portion
of the control premium. The sale is not impinged even though the
seller did not afford other shareholders the same opportunity to sell. 3
That is, the seller is not obliged to prorate his sale among existing share-
holders. In the absence of a ready market for the shares, it is unlikely
that the challenger could prove that the departing shareholder received
a premium for his shares.
As for the purchaser, one may question whether the fiduciary um-
51 Brudney, supra note 35, at 290-91. Although Brudney does not elaborate, it seems
fair to conclude that he advocates conferring upon existing shareholders a statutory
right of first refusal in any case of transfer of shares.
52 For cases holding incumbents accountable for selling their controlling block to
looters, see Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Insuranshares Corp.
v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940), 42 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa.
1941). Cf. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), rev'g 29 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
5sPeilman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
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brella should extend to share transactions beyond the requiring of ade-
quate disclosure. Professor Brudney's suggestion has the effect of freez-
ing the allocation of power at the moment the corporation is created
and prohibiting any control-affecting transfer of shares. But the in-
corporators have at their disposal a host of control devices to assure per-
petuation of whatever allocation of power they desire. Short of actual
employment of one of these devices, the law should not prescribe the
status quo to closely held corporations. Brudney asserts that the possi-
bility of a contractual restriction does not rule out a fiduciary restric-
tion, and that the fiduciary principles govern many situations where a
contractual provision could protect the parties. One may doubt, how-
ever, whether the cost of a condemnatory fiduciary rule is justified.54
54 Brudney, supra note 35, at 291, concludes as follows:
This is not to say that the stockholders of an essentially private venture should
be unable to waive such protection. But it is to suggest that unless they know-
ingly do so, the freedom of insiders to buy stock in order to acquire or strengthen
their control in close corporations should be subject to more restriction than
courts have heretofore imposed upon it.
So put, one's difference with Brudney narrows to the extent to which one is ready to
credit incorporators (and their legal advisers) with knowledge of the corporate rules.
One maintains that by not providing for a control device, the shareholders waived
whatever protection they could have received. Brudney would probably answer that
only a condemnatory rule, out of which the incorporators may contract, will focus the
incorporators' attention on the possible consequences of free transferability of shares.
Brudney, supra note 35, at 291-94, rejects on balance the introduction of a prohibitory
rule to share transactions by incumbents of publicly held corporations. But federal law
may impose restrictions on controlling shareholders of publicly held corporations.
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